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RFRA AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:  
DOES THE CONTRACEPTION MANDATE 
DISCRIMINATE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
EMPLOYERS? 
Alisa Lalana 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell1 is the 
most recent case to address the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) 
contraception mandate within the confines of the problematic 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). Congress 
enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith,2 which limited the scope of the 
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.3 Prior to Smith, courts applied 
an expansive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, finding any 
law which substantially burdened a religious belief unconstitutional 
unless the government had a “compelling interest” and “no 
alternative forms of regulation could be used to advance that 
interest.”4 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise 
 
   J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. International 
Relations, University of Southern California, May 2009. Thank you to Professor Aaron Caplan 
for his invaluable guidance and feedback during the writing process, the members of the Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and dedication, and my family for their 
unconditional support. 
 1. 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 3. Andrew Swindle, Virgin Mary or Mary Magdalene: An Examination of the 
Contraceptive Mandate Cases and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s Substantial Burden 
Standard, 66 ALA. L. REV. 925, 929 (2015). 
 4. Micah Schwartzman et al., The New Law of Religion: Hobby Lobby Rewrites Religious-
Freedom Law in Ways That Ignore Everything That Came Before, SLATE (July 3, 2014, 11:54 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/after_hobby 
_lobby_there_is_only_rfra_and_that_s_all_you_need.html; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (holding that an employer violated a Seventh-Day Adventist’s ability to freely exercise her 
religion by firing her when she refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons); see also 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin’s compulsory public school 
attendance law violated members of the Amish faith’s rights to freely exercise their religion by 
refusing to send their children, aged fourteen and fifteen, to public school after the completion of 
eighth grade). 
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Clause did not apply to neutral laws that were generally applicable to 
the public because any resulting religious burden would be incidental 
and unintentional.5 Worried by this perceived reduction in 
constitutional protection, Congress attempted to restore pre-Smith 
levels of protection against religious discrimination. Consequently, 
RFRA established religious exemptions to any federal regulation 
(generally applicable or otherwise) imposing a “substantial burden” 
on religious beliefs where the government fails to prove it was 
(1) the least restrictive method of furthering a (2) compelling 
government interest.6 Despite Congress’s good intentions to restore 
religious liberty protections, the courts’ interpretation of RFRA has 
exceeded the statute’s intended reach. Courts have allowed RFRA to 
become a vehicle for religious groups to undermine federal laws and 
evade compliance with those laws by drastically lowering the 
threshold to raise a discrimination claim.7 To monitor and invalidate 
discriminatory laws on the state level, several states have followed 
Congress’s lead and enacted their own state versions of RFRA.8 
These state RFRAs generally follow the same framework as the 
federal law and therefore are at risk of the same over-reaching 
judicial interpretation.9 
Since its enactment, the ACA’s contraception mandate has given 
rise to a number of federal RFRA claims.10 The mandate requires 
employers of over fifty full-time employees to provide compre-
hensive healthcare plans to their employees.11 These plans must 
include methods of contraception such as Plan B (the “morning after 
pill”).12 Little Sisters addressed whether the statutory process for 
religious groups to opt out of this requirement imposed a “substantial 
burden,” and whether the government failed to establish a 
 
 5. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) [hereinafter 
RFRA]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATORS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state 
-rfra-legislation.aspx [hereinafter 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Status of the Lawsuits Challenging the Affordable Care Act’s Birth Control Coverage 
Benefit, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files 
/pdfs/contraceptive_coverage_litigation_status_10-27-15.pdf (“Over 100 lawsuits have been filed 
in federal court challenging the Affordable Care Act’s birth control coverage benefit.”). 
 11. Swindle, supra note 3, at 927, 931. 
 12. Id. 
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compelling interest to justify that burden under the federal RFRA.13 
The opt-out process requires objecting religious organizations to 
notify Health and Human Services (HHS) of their faith-based 
inability to comply, which then shifts the responsibility to provide 
the required coverage to the third-party administrator (TPA)14 or 
health insurer.15 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a correct decision in 
deciding that the opt-out process built into the law did not 
substantially burden the Little Sisters’ religious beliefs.16 However, 
the Court of Appeals could only accomplish this by choosing to not 
follow the Supreme Court’s logic in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.17 This was a correct decision because Hobby Lobby’s 
interpretation of RFRA is unworkable: it greatly diminishes the 
threshold requirement to bring a RFRA claim by removing the 
court’s ability to fully measure the substantiality of a burden. The 
better approach is to replace RFRA’s “substantial burden” test and 
instead follow the reasonable accommodation framework used in 
employment law under Title VII. Little Sisters is a step in the right 
direction, but ultimately it will take amendments to both federal and 
state RFRAs to fully correct the problem. 
Part II of this Note discusses the history of religious exemptions 
and the evolution of how courts have applied them. It focuses on 
Congress’s motivation in creating RFRA and how the jurisprudence 
has developed—particularly after the enactment of the ACA. Part III 
then addresses the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Little Sisters and 
discusses its departure from the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hobby 
Lobby. It focuses on how the Hobby Lobby interpretation has made 
RFRA unworkable. Part IV then analyzes the needed changes to 
RFRA. It proposes the borrowing of “reasonable accommodation” 
analysis from Title VII used in employment law to determine the 
validity of a RFRA claim. Part V then addresses the further need to 
apply the proposed “reasonable accommodation” analysis from 
 
 13. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 
2015). 
 14. Id. at 1165–66. (A TPA is a person or company hired by an employer to manage the 
company’s insurance plans. The TPA’s role can range from claim service provider, performing 
ministerial duties or processing claims, to administrator of claims for reimbursements from 
employees, having the discretion to make important plan decisions.). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 1195. 
 17. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
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Part IV to state RFRA laws as well as the federal RFRA. Part VI 
concludes reiterating the need to apply Title VII framework to all 
RFRA laws. 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST 
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
A.  The Constitution and the Free Exercise Clause 
Under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”18 In Employment Division 
v. Smith, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the Free Exercise 
Clause by holding that it does not apply to religiously-neutral laws of 
general applicability.19 There, two members of the Native American 
Church were fired from their jobs after testing positive for peyote, 
which they ingested during a church ceremony for sacramental 
purposes.20 Subsequently, the state of Oregon denied those members’ 
applications for unemployment benefits because testing positive for 
illegal drugs constituted “misconduct,” which rendered them 
ineligible for benefits.21 
The Supreme Court held that because the Oregon statute made 
no mention of religious practices, it was not an attempt to “regulate 
religious beliefs,” but rather a neutral law of general applicability 
targeting drug use as a whole.22 Therefore, the Court concluded there 
was no violation of the Free Exercise Clause and that strict scrutiny 
need not be applied.23 Strict scrutiny involves analyzing whether a 
law is narrowly tailored—i.e., the least restrictive means possible—
to achieve a compelling government interest.24 
The Smith Court determined that although federal laws cannot 
directly interfere with religious beliefs and opinions, religious 
practices can be incidentally burdened.25 It explained that allowing 
individuals to violate federal law to adhere to their religious beliefs 
would be akin to making professed religious doctrines “superior to 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 19. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). 
 20. Id. at 874. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 892. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 907–08. 
 25. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)). 
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the law of the land, and in effect permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself.”26 The Court therefore held that the Oregon statute 
did not violate the Constitution, which “does not grant a right to 
religious exemptions from general legal obligations” when religious 
practices are incidentally burdened.27 Rather, the Free Exercise 
Clause “provide[s] a shield against religious discrimination,” only 
when a law is specifically directed at a religious practice.28 
Three years after its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed and applied this interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause 
in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.29 There, a 
Santeria church, whose practices involved animal sacrifice, obtained 
the proper permits to establish a church in the City of Hialeah, 
Florida.30 Shortly thereafter, the City called an emergency City 
Council meeting and passed an ordinance banning animal sacrifice.31 
The Court held that this was not a religiously-neutral ordinance and 
was clearly created to specifically prohibit the Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye’s practices.32 It looked to the minutes of the City 
Council meeting, which “evidence[d] significant hostility exhibited 
by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials 
toward the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice.”33 
One councilmember in support of the ordinance even referred to 
Santeria devotees at the Church as being “in violation of everything 
this country stands for.”34 
Therefore, the Court applied strict scrutiny to establish whether 
the law violated the Free Exercise Clause.35 To do this, it analyzed 
whether the City (1) had a compelling government interest that 
justified the burden on the Church, and (2) whether it was furthering 
that interest in the least restrictive way possible.36 The Court then 
determined that the government interest to prevent animal sacrifice 
was not sufficiently compelling and thus found the ordinance 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. James M. Oleske, Jr., Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty 
and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 ANIMAL L. 295, 297 (2013). 
 28. Id. 
 29. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 30. Id. at 526. 
 31. Id. at 522, 526. 
 32. Id. at 526. 
 33. Id. at 541. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 522. 
 36. Id. 
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unconstitutional.37 
B.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) 
Religious groups, Congress, and even secular civil liberties 
groups strongly opposed the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, 
fearing it created a loophole for Congress to pass discriminatory 
laws.38 As a response, RFRA was immediately proposed as a way to 
reinstate the strict scrutiny analysis beyond laws that target religious 
practices, and restore its additional application to neutral laws of 
general applicability.39 
Under RFRA, the first aspect of the court’s role is to decide 
whether the challenged law substantially burdens a plaintiff’s ability 
to freely exercise his or her sincerely held religious beliefs.40 
Although RFRA does not define a “substantial burden,” it explicitly 
references the Supreme Court’s framework for determining a burden 
under the Free Exercise Clause.41 Specifically, in discussing the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court has said that a substantial 
burden is imposed when a law conditions a “governmental benefit 
upon conduct that would violate [someone’s] religious beliefs.”42 
Once a plaintiff has established a substantial burden on religious 
exercise, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show that 
the law (1) “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest,” 
and (2) “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”43 
C.  Creation of State RFRAs 
Originally, the federal RFRA was applicable to both federal and 
state laws.44 However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,45 the Supreme 
 
 37. Id. at 530. 
 38. The ACLU and Freedom of Religion and Belief, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/aclu-and 
-freedom-religion-and-belief (last visited Mar. 14, 2016). 
 39. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 530. 
 40. La. Coll. v. Sebelius, 38 F. Supp. 3d 766, 778 (W.D. La. 2014). 
 41. Id. 
 42. RFRA, supra note 6 (citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv. 535 F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th 
Cir. 2008)). 
 43. Eugene Volokh, What Is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/02/1a-religious-freedom 
-restoration-act. 
 44. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8 (referencing City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), in which the Court stated that RFRA no longer applies to 
the states). 
 45. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Court overturned RFRA as applied to state law on the ground that the 
federal government “can regulate its own actions” but “cannot 
interpret the substantive meaning of the Constitution.”46 Therefore, 
the Court held that applying a federal law like RFRA to the states 
exceeded Congress’s constitutionally-granted authority.47 
Subsequently, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente 
Uniao do Vegetal,48 the Court confirmed that RFRA still applied to 
federal laws.49 There, it granted an injunction for a religious group 
who received communion by drinking hoasca tea, which contained a 
hallucinogenic prohibited under Schedule 1 of the Controlled 
Substance Act (CSA).50 In applying the strict scrutiny analysis 
required by RFRA, the Court found that the government failed to 
meet its burden of showing a compelling government interest; the 
Court therefore required a religious exemption to the CSA for the 
religious group.51 
After the Supreme Court decided in Boerne that RFRA only 
applies to federal laws, many states reacted by creating their own 
religious freedom laws.52 Currently, twenty-one states have their own 
state RFRAs,53 and twelve additional states have plans to introduce 
similar legislation.54 These laws are modeled after the federal RFRA 
and require the same substantial burden test.55 However, some states 
have created even stricter requirements. Arkansas, for example, does 
not just require a compelling government interest to justify a state 
law as the federal RFRA does, but goes further to define a 
compelling interest as an interest of the “highest magnitude.”56 
 
 46. Kathleen Sands, Territory, Wilderness, Property, and Reservation: Land and Religion in 
Native American Supreme Court Cases, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 253, 308 (2012). 
 47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S at 536. 
 48. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 439. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8. 
 53. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATORS  
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. 
Those states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Id. 
 54. 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, supra note 8 (“Colorado, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West 
Virginia and Wyoming are looking to add a RFRA or similar law to their state’s laws.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Howard M. Friedman, 10 Things You Need to Know to Really Understand RFRA in 
Indiana and Arkansas, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts 
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D.  The Affordable Care Act and Its Contraception Mandate 
The ACA was created in 2010 as a combination of two separate 
pieces of legislation: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act57 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010.58 The resulting ACA included a contraception mandate 
requiring employers of fifty or more full-time employees to provide 
health insurance plans that meet minimum standards of coverage. 
One of those minimum standards of coverage requires provision of 
preventative care for women without any cost to the insured.59 The 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), charged 
with defining the specific preventative care standards, ultimately 
required coverage of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and 
sterilization procedures, as well as patient education and counseling 
for women with reproductive capacity.60 
In creating this contraception mandate, the legislative and 
executive branches attempted to improve women’s health while 
significantly reducing healthcare costs.61 Studies show that even 
“moderate co-pays can cause women with low and moderate 
incomes to forego contraceptive services,” and in a 2009 survey, 
“twenty-three percent of women reported having difficulty affording 
birth control and twenty-four percent reported postponing a birth 
control or gynecological visit due to cost.”62 Because employer-
provided healthcare coverage constituted fifty-nine percent of total 
healthcare coverage in 2012, the success of the ACA hinges on the 
government’s ability to target these plans and acquire the support and 




 57. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 120 (2010). 
 58. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014). 
 59. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 
2015). 
 60. Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 785 
(2015). 
 61. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, The Union of Contraceptive Services and the Affordable Care 
Act Gives Birth to First Amendment Concerns, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 539, 540–541 (2013); 
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov 
/womensguidelines. 
 62. Tenenbaum, supra note 61, at 540–41. 
 63. Jeremy Thomas Harbaugh, Recent Case Developments: Federal Appellate Court Holds 
That a For-Profit Corporation Can Challenge the Contraception Mandate Under the RFRA, 39 
AM. J.L. & MED. 692, 695 (2013) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFF., ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE 
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E.  Hobby Lobby’s Interpretation of the ACA and RFRA 
In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff owners of closely held 
corporations alleged that the ACA’s requirement that they provide 
their employees with healthcare policies covering certain types of 
contraception substantially burdened their religious beliefs and thus 
violated RFRA.64 After determining that a closely held corporation 
qualified as “person” under RFRA,65 the Supreme Court held that 
plaintiffs were substantially burdened by the ACA’s contraception 
mandate and thus the onus shifted to the government to prove that 
the statute was the least restrictive method of furthering a compelling 
government interest.66 
The Court held that the government failed to prove the 
contraception mandate was the least restrictive means available to 
achieve its interest of providing affordable and comprehensive 
healthcare coverage to all Americans.67 The majority felt that the 
government could have easily narrowed the statute to provide for-
profit companies like Hobby Lobby with the same exemptions 
already offered to churches and religious non-profits.68 
Consequently, the Court held that the contraception mandate 
imposed an unjustified substantial burden, thus requiring a religious 
exemption.69 
The main flaw in the Hobby Lobby decision is that the Court 
found it beyond its purview to address the magnitude of a religious 
burden, despite the fact that RFRA specifically requires courts to 
analyze whether a burden is “substantial.”70 It viewed the question of 
substantiality to be one of “religion and moral philosophy,” which 
courts are not in a position to address.71 Furthermore, the Court 
reiterated previous warnings that “‘courts must not presume to 
 
COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME 
COURT DECISION, at tbl. 3 (2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011 
-2012/reports/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf. 
 64. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014). 
 65. Id. at 2679. 
 66. See id. at 2785–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 2786. 
 68. Id.; see Fact Sheet: Women’s Preventive Services Coverage, Non-Profit Religious 
Organizations, and Closely-Held For-Profit Entities, CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. 
OVERSIGHT, https://www.cms.gov/cciio/resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/womens-preven 
-02012013.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 69. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785. 
 70. Id. at 2778; see RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
 71. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
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determine . . . the plausibility of a religious claim.’”72 Although it has 
long been agreed that courts cannot address the plausibility of a 
religious belief, here, the Supreme Court incorrectly equated this 
analysis with measuring the magnitude of the burden.73 Instead, it 
considered a RFRA claim to be established simply because the 
plaintiffs had a religious belief, and it then accepted their contention 
that the burden was substantial.74 
The Hobby Lobby decision was controversial in part because it 
was seen as an attempt to “corporatize religious liberty,” applying 
exemptions to private companies that were traditionally reserved for 
churches and non-profits.75 Beyond this, however, the Court’s 
interpretation of the substantial burden test creates even greater 
jurisprudential issues. It renders the term “substantial,” as written in 
the statute, completely meaningless.76 
By merging the analysis regarding the magnitude of the burden 
with analysis of the reasonableness of a religious belief—which 
federal courts are forbidden to undertake—the Court set an 
unworkable precedent and paved the way for conflicting case law.77 
F.  Post-Hobby Lobby Changes to the ACA 
At the time of Hobby Lobby, the options available to a religious 
for-profit organization were either to simply comply with the 
regulation or pay a fine for non-compliance.78 The Supreme Court 
then made its Hobby Lobby ruling, applying the existing opt-out for 
non-profits to for-profits.79 
Shortly after making this decision, the Supreme Court heard a 
motion for a preliminary injunction in Wheaton College v. Burwell80 
and amended its interpretation of the existing opt-out process. 
Previously, organizations eligible to opt out were required to 
complete Employee Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) Form 
 
 72. Id. (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); 
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969)). 
 73. Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Schwartzman et al., supra note 4. 
 76. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 2775. 
 79. Id. at 2769–70. 
 80. 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
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700 and send copies to the health insurance company or TPA.81 In 
Wheaton College, the court simplified the process, requiring only 
that: 
[i]f the applicant informs the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services in writing that it is a non-profit 
organization that holds itself out as religious and has 
religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive 
services, the respondents are enjoined from enforcing 
against the applicant the challenged provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related 
regulations pending final disposition of appellate review.82 
This required notification can be sent to HHS via letter or email 
and must, at a minimum, contain: 
(1) the name of the eligible organization and the basis on 
which it qualifies for an accommodation; (2) its objection 
based on sincerely held religious beliefs to providing 
coverage of some or all contraceptive services, including 
any particular subset to which it objects; (3) the name and 
type of the group health plan; and (4) the name and contact 
information for any of the plan’s TPAs and/or health 
insurance issuers.83 
This requirement of notifying HHS is the provision at issue in 
Little Sisters.84 
III.  LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR HOME FOR THE AGED 
A.  Little Sisters of the Poor and Its RFRA Claim 
In Little Sisters, three groups of plaintiffs filed suit against the 
government regarding the religious opt-out provision of the ACA: 
Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene, and Reaching Souls.85 
Each group alleged that it was “substantially burdened” by the 
requirement to notify either HHS or its health insurance provider that 
 
 81. Id. at 2807. 
 82. Id.; see also Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2924 (2015) (reiterating that notification to 
HHS is sufficient and plaintiffs need not complete form 700). 
 83. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1164 (10th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 51092 (Aug. 27, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 84. Id. at 1160. 
 85. Id. at 1167–69. 
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it could not comply with the regulation for religious reasons.86 
One group, the Little Sisters of the Poor, belongs to an order of 
Catholic nuns who devote their lives to caring for the elderly.87 The 
organization provides health insurance to its employees through the 
Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust; the TPA for this 
organization is another Catholic organization, Christian Brothers 
Services.88 Its health insurance plans have always excluded 
“coverage of sterilization, contraception, and abortifacients . . . in 
accordance with their religious belief that deliberately avoiding 
reproduction through medical means is immoral.”89 Little Sisters 
argued that the opt-out process included in the ACA still made it 
complicit in the provision of contraceptives and therefore imposed a 
“substantial burden.” 90 This is because in accordance with its 
religious beliefs, it “cannot take actions that directly cause others to 
provide contraception or appear to participate in the Department’s 
delivery scheme.”91 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado originally 
denied Little Sisters an injunction. It held that the minor 
administrative task of notifying HHS and the TPA92 of its request to 
opt out did not impose a “substantial burden” on the nuns’ religious 
beliefs, and it contrasted Little Sisters’ situation with that in Hobby 
Lobby where no opt-out accommodation scheme existed for private 
for-profit corporations.93 
The second and third groups of plaintiffs also made legally 
similar claims to that of Little Sisters in that they argued complying 
with the opt-out process would violate their religious beliefs by 
making them morally complicit in the provision of contraception to 
their employees.94 However, when their claims were originally 
 
 86. Id. at 1159. 
 87. Id. at 1167. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 1168. 
 91. Id. 
 92. At the time of the district’s court decision, the Supreme Court had not yet heard Wheaton 
College and simplified the opt-out process. Little Sisters appealed to the Supreme Court and was 
granted an injunction that instead only required them to notify HHS of its religious objections. Id. 
at 1170. 
 93. Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 6 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1237 (D. 
Colo. 2013). 
 94. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1168; S. Nazarene Univ. v. Sebelius, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
179569, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2013); Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. CIV-13-
1092-D, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013). 
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heard, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma—referencing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hobby 
Lobby—granted injunctions, finding that the opt-out process did 
violate RFRA.95 In both cases, the district court ruled that the 
plaintiffs were “substantially burdened” because the opt-out 
provision required them to “violate their belief that participating in or 
facilitating the accommodation [was] the moral equivalent of directly 
complying with the contraceptive mandate.”96 
B.  The Tenth Circuit’s Decision 
The Tenth Circuit then consolidated the three plaintiffs’ cases on 
appeal.97 Because the RFRA analysis follows a burden-shifting 
framework,98 the court first focused on whether the plaintiffs 
established a prima facie RFRA claim, which requires the plaintiff to 
establish “(1) a substantial burden imposed by the federal 
government on a (2) sincere (3) exercise of religion.”99 Based on this 
structure of analysis, the court first had to determine whether the 
plaintiffs were “substantially burdened.”100 
The court determined that the most important aspect of the 
analysis is not deciding whether a burden on the plaintiffs exists at 
all, but whether a burden is substantial.101 Focusing on the need for a 
legal definition of “substantial,” it pointed out that “[i]f plaintiffs 
could assert and establish that a burden is ‘substantial’ without any 
possibility of judicial scrutiny, the word ‘substantial’ would become 
wholly devoid of independent meaning.”102 Accordingly, it held that 
the ACA’s process to opt out is “among the common and permissible 
methods of religious accommodation in a pluralist society, and does 
not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.”103 
In so holding, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that 
notifying HHS made them complicit with providing contraception 
 
 95. See S. Nazarene Univ., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179569, at *22–26; Reaching Souls Int’l, 
Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26. 
 96. Reaching Souls Int’l, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178752, at *26. 
 97. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1151, 1169. 
 98. Id. at 1175. 
 99. Id. (quoting Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1176. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1180–81; see also United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 960 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“Law accommodates religion; it cannot wholly exempt religion from the reach of the law.”). 
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and abortions, deciding that the plaintiffs’ roles were not causal.104 
Rather, the federal government obligates providing contraception and 
preventive care coverage and the opt-out provision simply shifts the 
burden of complying with that law.105 Furthermore, the requirements 
under the accommodation scheme are simply “de minimis 
administrative burdens,”106 which are allowable under the pre-Smith 
standards restored by RFRA.107 Because the court held there was no 
substantial burden, it did not need to apply strict scrutiny to 
determine whether the government had proved that a compelling 
interest was being furthered in the least restrictive way possible.108 
C.  The Tenth Circuit’s Deviation from Hobby Lobby 
Although the Tenth Circuit made many attempts to factually 
distinguish Little Sisters from Hobby Lobby,109 the legal issues 
addressed remained the same, although they were applied in different 
ways. The court correctly acknowledged that the most recent 
religious discrimination cases decided by the Tenth Circuit and 
Supreme Court110—Hobby Lobby,111 Yellowbear v. Lampert,112 
Ahdulhaseehb v. Calbone,113 and Holt v. Hobbs114—differed from 
Little Sisters in that those cases involved laws of general 
applicability that included no religious accommodation.115 By 
contrast, a religious accommodation not only existed but was the 
central issue of the plaintiffs’ claims in Little Sisters.116 
 
 104. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1182–84. 
 105. Id. at 1182. 
 106. Id. at 1175. 
 107. Id. Upon its creation, it was determined that the ACA’s religious accommodation 
scheme would require “that each of the estimated 122 organizations [would] spend approximately 
50 minutes in preparation time and incur $0.54 mailing cost to satisfy [its] requirements.” 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092, 
51097 (Aug. 27, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 108. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1195. 
 109. Id. at 1160. 
 110. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012). 
 111. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (where a Muslim prisoner’s request for a halal diet was denied). 
 112. 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 113. 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 114. 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (where a Muslim prisoner was not allowed to grow a beard in 
compliance with his faith and even his requests for a compromise to grow a short beard were 
denied). 
 115. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1171–72. Other than Hobby Lobby, these cases all involved 
claims for violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(RLUIPA), which requires the same showing of a “substantial burden” on a religious practice. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2012). 
 116. Id. at 1160. 
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Despite this important factual difference, all of these cases 
hinged on determining whether a “substantial burden” had been 
imposed.117 While the Supreme Court has indicated that the existence 
of an accommodation scheme can lessen the burden on a plaintiff,118 
the basic structure of analysis to be taken in each of these cases 
remains the same. The real issue is the absence of a clear “substantial 
burden” framework to guide courts. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby also argued that 
paying for a healthcare plan covering abortions and contraceptives 
made them complicit in acts that their religious beliefs disallowed.119 
The government (and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent) unsuccessfully 
argued that this complicity connection was too attenuated and that 
“providing the coverage would not itself result in the destruction of 
an embryo.”120 In Hobby Lobby, however, the Supreme Court held 
that in making this argument, HHS and the dissent were asking the 
Court to analyze the reasonableness of the religious belief—which 
federal courts “have no business addressing”121—rather than the 
substantiality of the burden.122 
The Tenth Circuit in Little Sisters relied on precisely the same 
attenuation argument regarding complicity as HHS and the dissent in 
Hobby Lobby, which the Court rejected.123 The Little Sisters court, 
however, used that same argument to determine that a substantial 
burden did not exist and ultimately conclude that “[p]laintiffs d[id] 
not ‘trigger’ or otherwise cause contraceptive coverage because 
federal law, not the act of opting out, entitle[d] plan participants and 
beneficiaries to coverage.”124 Furthermore, “[a]lthough Plaintiffs 
allege[d] the administrative tasks required to opt out of the Mandate 
ma[de] them complicit in the overall delivery scheme, opting out 
instead relieve[d] them from complicity.”125 But this is no different 
 
 117. Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 864; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 
(2014); Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1178; Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55; Ahdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d at 
1315–19. 
 118. See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1160 (citing Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759; Yellowbear, 
741 F.3d at 56). 
 119. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, 
they believe they will be facilitating abortions . . . .”). 
 120. Id. (quoting Brief for the Petitioners at 31–34, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354)); id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 2778. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.; Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1178–80. 
 124. Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1173. 
 125. Id. at 1173–74. 
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than the dissent’s rejected argument in Hobby Lobby—that the 
insurance plans provide contraception and abortions, not the 
employers providing the plan.126 
It is true the employers in Little Sisters were in fact removed one 
step further from these actions than were the employers in Hobby 
Lobby. The Hobby Lobby employers sought an exemption from 
compliance with the actual contraception mandate, whereas the Little 
Sisters employers sought an exemption from the opt-out process. For 
this reason, the Little Sisters court logically argued that those 
plaintiffs suffered less of a burden.127 The problem, however, is that 
the mere fact that the Little Sisters court addressed this argument 
goes directly against the reasoning in Hobby Lobby, where the court 
explained that analyzing this complicity argument constitutes a 
forbidden analysis of the reasonableness of a religious belief.128 
IV.  PROPOSED APPLICATION OF TITLE VII FRAMEWORK TO RFRA 
A.  Title VII and Reasonable Accommodation 
In employment law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
governs the structure of analysis a court uses when an employee 
claims religious discrimination.129 Just as the current RFRA 
framework requires, Title VII requires courts to make a two-pronged 
analysis.130 Under both systems, the first prong requires that a 
plaintiff establish a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the 
government or employer to justify their actions.131 A prima facie 
case for religious discrimination under Title VII is established when 
an employee shows that: (1) “he or she has a bona fide religious 
belief that conflicts with an employment requirement”; (2) “he or she 
informed the employer of this belief;” and (3) “he or she was 
disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment 
requirement.”132 
 
 126. Cf. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would conclude that 
the connection . . . is too attenuated to rank as substantial. The requirement carries no command 
that [Plaintiffs] purchase or provide the contraceptives they find objectionable. Instead, it calls on 
the companies . . . to direct money into undifferentiated funds . . . under comprehensive health 
plans. Those plans . . . must [then] offer contraceptive coverage without cost sharing . . . .”). 
 127. See Little Sisters, 794 F.3d at 1177–78. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991). 
 130. Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 65–66 (1986) (quoting Turpen v. Mo.-
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Once a prima facie claim is established, the second prong of 
analysis shifts the burden of proof to the employer to demonstrate 
that it offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee, or else 
prove that it “is unable to reasonably accommodate . . . an 
employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”133 There is no 
set requirement for what accommodation an employer must offer, so 
long as it is reasonable.134 Additionally, an accommodation is found 
to cause “undue hardship” whenever “that accommodation results in 
‘more than a de minimis cost’ to the employer.”135 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, diminished the 
meaning of a “substantial burden” so much that the threshold 
question to establish a prima facie RFRA claim is no different than 
the requirement of a “bona fide religious belief” under Title VII. Yet 
under Title VII, a low threshold for a plaintiff to establish a prima 
facie claim is balanced out by a more difficult merits test for the 
plaintiff in the latter part of the analysis, where an employer’s good 
faith attempt to make a reasonable accommodation is enough to 
justify its actions. If the Court is going to lower RFRA’s threshold 
test and adopt the simple requirement of a “bona fide religious 
belief” that conflicts with the law, it must also raise the bar in the 
second prong of the analysis regarding the merits of the claim. 
RFRA should be amended so that it no longer applies the current 
version of the “compelling interest test.” Instead, once the burden 
shifts to the government to justify its actions, just as under Title VII, 
the court should look to whether the government made a good faith 
effort to accommodate the plaintiffs and their religious beliefs. In 
employment law, an accommodation does not have to be effective to 
be reasonable; it simply has to be a legitimate attempt to work and 
compromise with the employee.136 If the accommodation causes 
undue hardship to the company, such accommodation is not required, 
 
Kan.-Tex. R.R. Co., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
 133. Id. at 63; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 134. Ansonia, 479 U.S. at 68. 
 135. Id. at 67 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n. 9 (1977) 
(emphasis in original)); see 118 Cong. Rec. 705–06 (1972). 
 136. See Trans World, 432 U.S. at 66–70. The court in Trans World held that an employer 
airline was not in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it failed to give an employee 
Saturdays off to follow religious tenets. Id. The employer met with the employee to discuss 
alternatives, attempted to find someone to swap shifts, and tried to find the employee another job. 
Id. Making this legitimate attempt to work with the employee was found to be sufficient even 
though it did not allow the employee to properly conduct his religious observation. Id. 
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as that would cease to be “reasonable.”137 Analogizing RFRA claims 
to Title VII claims, undue hardship should be equated with an 
undermining of the government’s compelling interest achieved by 
the law. An accommodation would be found unreasonable if it stops 
the government from achieving those motivating objectives. 
B.  Title VII as Applied to Little Sisters 
If the Tenth Circuit had used this Title VII approach in Little 
Sisters, it would have first considered whether organizations had a 
“bona fide religious belief” that conflicted with the ACA’s 
contraception mandate. The Little Sisters would have satisfied this 
first step of proving a prima facie claim, and the court would have 
then looked to whether the government could justify its actions. 
Within the Title VII framework, HHS would have to prove that it 
either offered a reasonable accommodation to religious organizations 
such as Little Sisters, or show that no accommodation could be made 
without undermining the purpose of the contraception mandate. 
In Little Sisters, the government offered an accommodation in 
the form of an opt-out provision that would likely satisfy this 
standard. Under Title VII analysis, the accommodation must be 
reasonable; it need not necessarily be effective. Here, the 
government offered an opt-out provision to relieve religious 
organizations of the responsibility to provide healthcare coverage 
conflicting with their religious beliefs. The fact that this opt out is 
still not satisfactory to Little Sisters is not a crucial factor in this 
analytical framework. The important consideration is that the 
government made a legitimate attempt to resolve religious 
organizations’ concerns. Therefore, using this Title VII-like analysis, 
the Tenth Circuit would have been able to logically come to the same 
conclusion—that the opt-out provision is not a violation of RFRA—
while still working within the confines of the RFRA framework. 
V.  APPLICATION OF TITLE VII FRAMEWORK TO STATE RFRAS 
A.  Differences Between the Federal RFRA and State RFRAs 
Applying the above-proposed changes to the federal RFRA is 
not enough to resolve the overall issue; the changes must also be 
applied to state RFRAs. Due to inherent differences in federal and 
 
 137. Id. 
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state laws, the existence of state RFRAs has even broader 
consequences than the federal RFRA. Already, one unforeseen 
consequence is that many social conservatives are now attempting to 
use state RFRAs as a way to evade non-discrimination laws and 
avoid providing services to members of the LGBT community and 
other minority groups.138 It is in this context that the RFRAs of 
Indiana and Arkansas have recently garnered a great deal of media 
attention and opposition.139 These two states have some of the most 
extreme language in their RFRAs, which are not necessarily 
indicative of the remaining nineteen existing laws, yet they represent 
a growing problem caused by the rise of state RFRAs. 
Indiana Governor Mike Pence argued that Indiana’s RFRA is an 
exact copy of the federal RFRA.140 However, Senator Chuck 
Schumer, who authored the federal RFRA of 1993, strongly 
disagreed and commented that the two laws can be considered mirror 
images, “only if you’re using a Funhouse mirror.”141 The important 
difference is that Indiana’s RFRA applies even in cases where the 
government is not a party; it can therefore protect the discriminatory 
actions of private individuals.142 Specifically, the law provides that 
after an individual suffers a substantial burden on religious beliefs, 
he or she may assert a RFRA violation as a claim or defense, 
“regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a 
party to the proceeding.”143 This greatly expands the circumstances 
under which someone can claim religious freedom as a defense.144 
Because of this addition to Indiana’s RFRA, many religious 
groups are attempting to justify their actions and evade compliance 
with non-discrimination laws by alleging a burden on their religious 
beliefs.145 For example, in arguing against same-sex marriages, those 
groups have contended that “facilitating or assisting individuals to 
 
 138. David Johnson and Katy Steinmetz, This Map Shows Every State with Religious-
Freedom Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2015), http://time.com/3766173/religious-freedom-laws-map 
-timeline. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Mariano Castillo, Five Things You Haven’t Considered About Indiana’s Religious 
Freedom Law, CNN (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/politics/indiana 
-religion-law-text. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Garrett Epps, What Makes Indiana’s Religious-Freedom Law Different?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas 
-religious-freedom-law-different/388997. 
 143. IND. CODE § 34-13-9-9 (2015). 
 144. Castillo, supra note 140. 
 145. Friedman, supra note 56. 
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enter other kinds of marital relationships requires them to act in 
contravention of their religious beliefs.”146 Many worry that if this 
continues, states will use their respective RFRAs to combat non-
discrimination laws and provide legal cover for stores that refuse to 
serve LGBT customers or employers who fire LBGT employees.147 
It is not a far stretch to predict that this problem could extend beyond 
the LGBT community to justify and protect actions of racial and 
gender discrimination. 
Addressing the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee, the ACLU 
outlined its opposition to the then proposed SB 568, Indiana’s 
RFRA.148 The ACLU cited numerous examples of discrimination 
justified under other states’ similar RFRA laws:149 First, a police 
officer in Oklahoma refused to attend or even assign another officer 
to attend a community relations event held at a mosque, claiming a 
moral dilemma and substantial burden on his religious beliefs.150 
Second, in several states, pharmacists used religious freedom as a 
defense for refusing to dispense contraception.151 Furthermore, in 
Michigan, a school guidance counselor refused to help gay students, 
claiming a religious burden.152 Finally, plaintiffs have challenged 
even commonplace regulations such as wearing a hardhat or 
providing a social security number as violations of religious liberties 
under some state RFRAs.153 
Although not all state RFRAs include Indiana’s drastic 
language, they do center around the federal RFRA’s flawed 
substantial burden test.154 Pennsylvania’s RFRA, for example, not 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Johnson & Steinmetz, supra note 138. 
 148. SB 101 and SB 568—Indiana’s “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA): Hearing 
on SB 101 and SB 568 Before the Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee (Ind. 2015) (statement of 
Jane Henegar, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana), http://www.aclu 
-in.org/images/newsReleases/RFRA_testimony_w_edits_2-9-15.pdf. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (citing Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
 151. Id. (citing Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate, WASH. POST (Mar. 
28, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5490-2005Mar27.html). 
 152. Id. (citing Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011)). 
 153. Id. (citing Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 
189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999) and Harris v. Bus., Transp. & Hous. Agency, No. C 07-0459 PJH, 
2007 WL 1140667 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007)). 
 154. See 71 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2002); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2016) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is both: (1) In furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest. (2) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2013) (“The right to act or 
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only requires a “substantial burden,” but unlike the federal RFRA 
goes on to define it as 
[a]n agency action which does any of the following: 
(1) Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or 
expression mandated by a person’s sincerely held religious 
beliefs; (2) Significantly curtails a person’s ability to 
express adherence to the person’s religious faith; (3) Denies 
a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities 
which are fundamental to the person’s religion; [or] 
(4) Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific 
tenet of a person’s religious faith.155 
Some states, such as Alabama, don’t even require the burden 
imposed by a law to be substantial, thereby lowering the threshold 
requirement to bring a RFRA claim even further.156 Therefore, the 
main differences between the federal and state RFRAs are that many 
states have gone beyond the federal RFRA in their laws and made it 
even easier for plaintiffs to win RFRA claims. 
B.  Benefits of Applying Title VII to State RFRAs 
The main purpose of the above-proposed changes to RFRA is to 
balance out the two prongs of the analysis and eliminate the 
impossible-to-apply substantial burden test. Because many state 
RFRAs create an even greater imbalance between the prongs than 
exists in the federal RFRA, Title VII’s application on the state level 
is arguably even more important. 
These state RFRAs are all relatively new and therefore have not 
gone through the long sequence of judicial interpretation that the 
federal RFRA has. However, it is foreseeable that the same problems 
will eventually arise. The trends in amendments to state RFRAs 
seem to already mimic changes that have occurred over time to the 
federal RFRA. For example, the Indiana RFRA as initially written 
applied to both for-profit and non-profit religious organizations prior 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which extended 
the federal RFRA’s application to closely held corporations and 
 
refuse to act in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief may not be substantially 
burdened unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it has a compelling 
governmental interest in infringing the specific act or refusal to act and has used the least 
restrictive means to further that interest.”). 
 155. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2002). 
 156. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01. 
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individuals.157 
Application of Title VII to the federal RFRA without further 
application to state RFRAs will not completely solve the problem. 
Because both types of RFRAs involve the same substantial burden 
requirement, the only way to address the overarching issue is to 
amend the RFRA framework across the board. This would require 
Congress to amend the federal RFRA in addition to state legislatures 
individually amending their own versions. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite Congress’s good intentions to restore protections against 
religious discrimination post-Smith, courts have analyzed the federal 
RFRA in a way that causes more harm than good. They have 
lowered the threshold for establishing a RFRA claim to the point that 
any burden would be considered substantial simply at a plaintiff’s 
say-so. In a two-pronged framework, a low burden on a plaintiff in 
the first prong must be balanced out with a higher burden in the 
second. However, under the current interpretation of RFRA, the 
burden remains low for a plaintiff in both prongs. The second phase 
of analysis imposes a very high burden on the government to prove 
that the law was the least restrictive method of achieving a 
compelling government interest. This entire framework is far too 
plaintiff-friendly in that plaintiffs can rest entirely on the 
government’s failure to meet its high burden of proof without having 
to prove anything about the actual burden they claim to suffer. 
In Little Sisters, the Tenth Circuit finally showed a willingness 
to address this problem, but it was limited by the reasoning in 
existing case law. It could only make a proper ruling by deviating 
from the logic used in Hobby Lobby. Because of the flawed prior 
analysis, the only way to fully address this problem is to amend 
RFRA and create a new framework modeled after the reasonable 
accommodation analysis used in Title VII cases. This change would 
create needed balance between the two prongs of the test—the 
plaintiff’s establishment of a prima facie claim and the defendant’s 
justification for its actions—to simplify the analytical framework to 
allow for more consistent application of the statute. 
Simply applying this proposed change to the federal RFRA 
however, will not properly address the overall issue. Because states 
 
 157. RFRA, supra note 6. 
Fall 2016] RFRA AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 683 
continue to enact their own state RFRAs, religious groups would still 
be able to easily evade compliance with crucial laws on the state 
level, particularly anti-discrimination laws. The underlying issue of 
religious groups using their beliefs as a means to avoid compliance 
with laws can therefore only be fully addressed if the above-
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